

Message Text

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ORIGIN NODS-00

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DRAFTED BY PM/ISP:DGOMPERT;EUR/SOV:WEDGAR;EA/PRCM:JSROY:CED
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S E C R E T STATE 199643 TOSEC 090060

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS), CH, UR, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S PEKING VISIT: TALKING POINTS ON
US-SOVIET INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY COMPARISONS

REF: SECTO 9005, PEKING 1821

PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY FIRST THING TUESDAY MORNING.

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7. ECONOMIC SITUATION -- TALKING POINTS:

-- ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET ECONOMY HAS BEEN GROWING FASTER THAN THE US ECONOMY IN CERTAIN SECTORS, ESPECIALLY HEAVY INDUSTRY, SOVIET GNP IS STILL LESS THAN THREE-FIFTHS THE SIZE OF OURS AND THE ABSOLUTE GAP BETWEEN OUR RESPECTIVE GNP'S HAS BEEN WIDENING.

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8. US-SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE - BACKGROUND

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THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE DIFFERENT MISSIONS WHICH REFLECT EACH COUNTRY'S DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONS, HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES, AND POLITICAL-ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS. MAJOR ASYMMETRIES CONSEQUENTLY EXIST IN FORCE STRUCTURE AND THOSE PROGRAMS WHICH RECEIVE EMPHASIS BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. CONSEQUENTLY, SPECIFIC TRADE-OFFS AND RATIOS BETWEEN SIMILAR AND INTERACTIVE CAPABILITIES HAVE DIFFERENT IMPLICATIONS FOR EACH SIDE. TO THE DEGREE THAT ONE CAN AGGREGATE, HOWEVER, IT CAN BE SAID THAT AN OVERALL MILITARY EQUIVALENCE NOW EXISTS BETWEEN THE US AND ITS ALLIES ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, ON THE OTHER.

9. SOVIET MILITARY PRODUCTION EFFORTS OVER THE PAST DECADE OR SO HAVE BROUGHT THE USSR CLOSER TO THE US IN OVERALL MILITARY POWER. THIS BUILD-UP INCLUDED A STEADY GROWTH OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, THE MODERNIZATION AND GROWTH OF SOVIET ARMOR AND ARTILLERY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, IMPROVED CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES, THE APPEARANCE OF A BLUE-WATER NAVY AND OTHER FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITIES, AND IMPROVED AND EXPANDED INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES.

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10. AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL AND IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ROUGH MILITARY EQUIVALENCE PREVAILS. OTHERWISE, ASSYMMETRIES EXIST:

- THE US AND ITS ALLIES ARE SUPERIOR IN NAVAL AND AIR POWER, ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, AND FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITY.
- THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES HAVE MORE NUMEROUS GROUND FORCES.

11. THIS GENERAL SITUATION IS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS, EXCEPT INsofar AS THE US AND ITS ALLIES SUCCEED IN TRANSLATING THEIR CLEAR EDGE IN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL POWER INTO AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD MILITARY ADVANTAGE. WITH THE US NOW LAUNCHING SIGNIFICANT NEW MILITARY PROGRAMS, MANY SPECIFIC SOVIET ADVANTAGES THAT MAY NOW EXIST WILL LIKELY DECLINE BY THE MID-1980'S.

12. TALKING POINTS

STRATEGIC FORCES

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVOTED MOST OF THEIR STRATEGIC FORCE BUILD-UP TO THE PRODUCTION OF MODERN LARGE ICBM'S.

- UNLIKE THE US, WHICH HAS A THREE-LEGGED STRATEGIC TRIAD, THE SOVIETS LACK A SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE.

- GROWTH IN SOVIET MISSILE THROWWEIGHT AND WARHEAD NUMBERS HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED IN THEIR ICBM'S, RATHER THAN DISTRIBUTED EVENLY BETWEEN THEIR ICBM AND SLBM FORCES. THUS, THE SOVIETS HAVE INVESTED MASSIVELY IN WHAT IS BECOMING AN INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TYPE OF STRATEGIC SYSTEM.

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-- MOREOVER, AS THE SOVIETS HAVE IMPROVED THEIR ABILITY TO THREATEN THE US ICBM FORCE, WE ARE PROCEEDING TO STRENGTHEN THE OTHER TWO LEGS OF OUR TRIAD IN WAYS THAT MORE THAN OFFSET THE SOVIET ICBM BUILD-UP.

- OUR CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM WILL GIVE US THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABLE OF PENETRATING SOVIET AIR DEFENSES.

- OUR TRIDENT SUBMARINE AND MISSILE PROGRAMS WILL FURTHER STRENGTHEN AN SSBN/SLBM FORCE WITH VIRTUAL INVULNERABILITY AND AWESOME DESTRUCTIVE POWER.

- OVERALL, WE ENJOY AN ADVANTAGE -- OVER THREE-TO-ONE -- IN DELIVERABLE WARHEADS.

- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PAYLOAD OF THE US BOMBER FORCE, THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN MISSILE THROWWEIGHT IS MORE THAN OFFSET.

-- OUR TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD IN STRATEGIC FORCES IS CLEAR:

- OUR STRATEGIC MISSILES ARE MORE ACCURATE, MORE RELIABLE, AND MAINTAINED AT A HIGHER STATE OF READINESS.

- WE ARE ABLE TO PUT MORE WARHEADS ON EACH MISSILE BECAUSE OF OUR UNMATCHED SOPHISTICATION IN ELECTRONICS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY.

- OUR CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY HAS SURGED FAR AHEAD OF THE USSR'S.

- OUR SUBMARINES ARE HARDER TO DETECT -- AND OUR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES ARE FAR MORE ADVANCED.

-- CONTINUED GROWTH OF THE SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM WOULD BE CAUSE FOR CONCERN, BUT THE PROGRAM NOW APPEARS TO BE DESIGNED ONLY TO PROVIDE SOME PROTECTION FOR THE SOVIET POLITICAL ELITE AND KEY INDUSTRIAL MANAGERS AND WORKERS, RATHER THAN THE

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GENERAL POPULATION. WE ARE FOLLOWING THIS PROGRAM CLOSELY.

- THE ECONOMY -- AND PROBABLY THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TOO -- WOULD BE DESTROYED IN THE EVENT OF WAR.

-- IN SUM, WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE RECENT ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC FORCES, WE REMAIN VIGILANT, DETERMINED, AND CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN HAVE NO HOPE OF ACHIEVING SUPERIORITY, NO MATTER HOW INTENSIVE THEIR EFFORT.

-- OUR FORCES WILL REMAIN SUFFICIENT TO DETER SOVIET ATTACK AND TO DENY THE SOVIETS ANY MILITARY OR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE FROM THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES.

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

-- THE US HAS MORE THEATER NUCLEAR WARHEADS THAN THE USSR.

-- THE SOVIETS ARE MODERNIZING THEIR THEATER NUCLEAR POSTURE WITH SUCH WEAPONS AS THE SS-X-20 MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE. BUT THE US HAS SEVERAL NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS -- E.G., NEW TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, LANCE MISSILES -- TO ENSURE A STABLE OVERALL NUCLEAR BALANCE WILL BE MAINTAINED.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

-- GENERALLY SPEAKING, SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS AND LARGE-SCALE TANK, ARTILLERY, AIRCRAFT, AND SHIP PRODUCTION CONFRONT THE US AND ITS ALLIES WITH A SERIOUS CHALLENGE IN THE AREA OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. HOWEVER, THE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE RESPONDED WITH THEIR OWN FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO MEET THE SOVIET CHALLENGE.

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-- BUT THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, WHERE THE GROWTH IN SOVIET AND WESTERN CONVENTIONAL POWER HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED, IS CURRENTLY STABLE.

- INCALCULABLY HIGH RISKS WOULD FACE AN AGGRESSOR.

- THE USSR COULD NOT BE CONFIDENT OF MILITARY SUCCESS IN THE EVENT OF A EUROPEAN WAR.

-- QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS WHICH SHOW SOME SOVIET LEADS ARE NOT ALWAYS USEFUL IN LOOKING AT GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. THEY IGNORE DIFFERENCES IN THE QUALITY OF WEAPONS AND TRAINING, WHICH GENERALLY FAVOR THE WESTERN ALLIES. MOREOVER, WESTERN GROUND

FORCE DOCTRINE PUTS A GREATER PROPORTION OF WEAPONS ON LINE THAN THE WARSAW PACT'S. FINALLY, EVEN QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS DO NOT SHOW NATO IN A BAD LIGHT.

-- EACH SIDE HAS OVER TWO MILLION MEN IN THEIR GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS STATION LARGE FORCES IN ASIA, AND THEY CANNOT BE CONFIDENT OF THE MILITARY PERFORMANCE OF THEIR SO-CALLED ALLIES, WHO PROVIDE NEARLY HALF OF THE WARSAW PACT'S TROOPS.

-- SOVIET NUMERICAL TANK SUPERIORITY REFLECTS NATO'S ESSENTIALLY DEFENSIVE ROLE, AND IS OFFSET BY NATO'S QUALITATIVE SUPERIORITY IN ANTI-TANK WEAPONRY.

-- THE TOTAL NATO AND WARSAW PACT TACTICAL AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES ARE ABOUT EQUAL.

- BUT NATO ENJOYS SUBSTANTIAL QUALITATIVE AIR SUPERIORITY.

- THE US HAS A DEFINITE EDGE IN HIGH PERFORMANCE, MULTI-PURPOSE AIRCRAFT WITH SUPERIOR GROUND ATTACK EFFECTIVENESS, RANGE, PAYLOAD AND ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY.

-- THE US AND ITS ALLIES ARE NOW ENGAGED IN A SECRET

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MAJOR FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, THE THRUST OF WHICH IS AIMED AT EXPLOITING OUR CONSIDERABLE TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD TO OFFSET THE SOVIET BUILD-UP.

- IN THE FUTURE, QUALITATIVE FACTORS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING MILITARY BALANCE.

-- THE ADVENT OF NEW WESTERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS -- AS PRECISION-GUIDED MISSILES -- WILL MAKE NUMERICAL COMPARISONS OF TANKS AND AIRCRAFT INCREASINGLY UNIMPORTANT.

-- THE OVERALL NAVAL BALANCE WILL REMAIN FAVORABLE TO THE US BY A WIDE MARGIN.

- THE SOVIET SURFACE NAVY IS NO MATCH FOR THE US CARRIER FORCE.

- THE SOVIETS HAVE A LEAD IN NUMBERS OF SUBMARINES. BUT US SUBMARINES ARE UNDENIABLY BETTER, AS ARE US ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO SOUGHT TO IMPROVE OTHER POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES -- WITH AIRBORNE FORCES, NAVAL INFANTRY, AIR TRANSPORT, AND AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS. BUT NONE OF THESE PROGRAMS SIGNIFICANTLY CHALLENGES THE US PREPONDERANCE IN POWER PROJECTION. FOR EXAMPLE:

- WHILE SOVIET AMPHIBIOUS TONNAGE HAS DOUBLED IN THE LAST DECADE, IT IS STILL ONLY ONE-SEVENTH OF US AMPHIBIOUS TONNAGE.

- SOVIET NAVAL INFANTRY HAS ALSO DOUBLED,

BUT IS LESS THAN ONE-TENTH THE SIZE OF THE US MARINE CORPS.

- THE LIFT CAPACITY OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC AIRLIFT IS ONLY HALF THE US AIRLIFT CAPACITY AT COMPARABLE RANGES.

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CONCLUSION

-- A SOPHISTICATED ANALYSIS OF US AND SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES DEFINITELY DOES NOT REVEAL A SOVIET ADVANTAGE.

-- IN THE TWO AREAS WHERE THE SOVIET BUILD-UP HAS BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE -- STRATEGIC FORCES AND CENTRAL FRONT STRENGTH -- FORCE IMPROVEMENTS THAT THE US HAS ALREADY PUT IN MOTION WILL MAINTAIN AND IN TIME STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION.

13. ILLUSTRATIVE DATA

DELIVERABLE WARHEADS: US USSR

ICBM	2154	2195	
SLBM	5120	785	
BOMBERS (EXCLUDING SRAM)	1256		270
TOTAL	8530	3250	

GROSS EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE (EMT):

ICBM	1150	2950
SLBM	780	785
TOTAL	1930	3735

THROW-WEIGHT (MILLIONS LBS):

ICBM	2.4	7.0
SLBM	.9	1.2
TOTAL	3.3	8.2

BOMBER PAYLOAD (MILLIONS LBS): US USSR

23 5

GROUND FORCE MANPOWER (COMBAT AND DIRECT SUPPORT - IN THOUSANDS):

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NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

NATO WP (OF WHICH USSR)

635 910 620

SOUTHERN EUROPE

540 395 155

MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN SERVICE:

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

NATO WP (OF WHICH USSR)

7000 19000 11000

SOUTHERN EUROPE

4000 7500 2750

ARTILLERY PIECES IN SERVICE:

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

NATO WP

2700 5600

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FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM SECSTATE WASHDC DATED AUGUST 22, 1977
SENT USDEL SECRETARY IS REPEATED TO YOU: QUOTE

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-- SOVIET PRODUCTIVITY IS STILL RELATIVELY LOW, AND THEY CANNOT INTRODUCE TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION INTO THEIR ECONOMY AS EFFECTIVELY AS WE CAN. IN ADDITION, THEY MAY BE FACED WITH A SERIOUS OIL SHORTAGE OVER THE NEXT DECADE.

-- WHILE SOVIETS NOW PRODUCE MORE STEEL, IRON, AND COAL THAN WE DO, THIS HAS LESS RELEVANCE TO MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN TODAY'S WORLD THAN TECHNOLOGY, WHERE WE RETAIN A SIGNIFICANT LEAD.

8. US-SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE - BACKGROUND

THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE DIFFERENT MISSIONS WHICH REFLECT EACH COUNTRY'S DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONS, HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES, AND POLITICAL-ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS. MAJOR ASYMMETRIES CONSEQUENTLY EXIST IN FORCE STRUCTURE AND THOSE PROGRAMS WHICH RECEIVE EMPHASIS BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. CONSEQUENTLY, SPECIFIC TRADE-OFFS AND RATIOS BETWEEN SIMILAR AND INTERACTIVE CAPABILITIES HAVE DIFFERENT IMPLICATIONS

FOR EACH SIDE. TO THE DEGREE THAT ONE CAN AGGREGATE, HOWEVER, IT CAN BE SAID THAT AN OVERALL MILITARY EQUIVALENCE NOW EXISTS BETWEEN THE US AND ITS ALLIES ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, ON THE OTHER.

9. SOVIET MILITARY PRODUCTION EFFORTS OVER THE PAST DECADE OR SO HAVE BROUGHT THE USSR CLOSER TO THE US IN OVERALL MILITARY POWER. THIS BUILD-UP INCLUDED A STEADY GROWTH OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, THE MODERNIZATION AND GROWTH OF SOVIET ARMOR AND ARTILLERY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, IMPROVED CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES, THE APPEARANCE OF A BLUE-WATER NAVY AND OTHER FORCE PROJECTION CAPA-
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BILITIES, AND IMPROVED AND EXPANDED INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES.

10. AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL AND IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ROUGH MILITARY EQUIVALENCE PREVAILS. OTHERWISE, ASSYMMETRIES EXIST:

- THE US AND ITS ALLIES ARE SUPERIOR IN NAVAL AND AIR POWER, ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, AND FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITY.
- THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES HAVE MORE NUMEROUS GROUND FORCES.

11. THIS GENERAL SITUATION IS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS, EXCEPT INsofar AS THE US AND ITS ALLIES SUCCEED IN TRANSLATING THEIR CLEAR EDGE IN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL POWER INTO AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD MILITARY ADVANTAGE. WITH THE US NOW LAUNCHING SIGNIFICANT NEW MILITARY PROGRAMS, MANY SPECIFIC SOVIET ADVANTAGES THAT MAY NOW EXIST WILL LIKELY DECLINE BY THE MID-1980'S.

12. TALKING POINTS

STRATEGIC FORCES

- THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVOTED MOST OF THEIR STRATEGIC FORCE BUILD-UP TO THE PRODUCTION OF MODERN LARGE ICBM'S.
- UNLIKE THE US, WHICH HAS A THREE-LEGGED STRATEGIC TRIAD, THE SOVIETS LACK A SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE.
- GROWTH IN SOVIET MISSILE THROWWEIGHT AND WARHEAD NUMBERS HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED IN THEIR ICBM'S, RATHER THAN DISTRIBUTED EVENLY BETWEEN THEIR
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ICBM AND SLBM FORCES. THUS, THE SOVIETS HAVE INVESTED MASSIVELY IN WHAT IS BECOMING AN INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TYPE OF STRATEGIC SYSTEM.

-- MOREOVER, AS THE SOVIETS HAVE IMPROVED THEIR ABILITY TO THREATEN THE US ICBM FORCE, WE ARE PROCEEDING TO STRENGTHEN THE OTHER TWO LEGS OF OUR TRIAD IN WAYS THAT MORE THAN OFFSET THE SOVIET ICBM BUILD-UP.

- OUR CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM WILL GIVE US THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABLE OF PENETRATING SOVIET AIR DEFENSES.

- OUR TRIDENT SUBMARINE AND MISSILE PROGRAMS WILL FURTHER STRENGTHEN AN SSBN/SLBM FORCE WITH VIRTUAL INVULNERABILITY AND AWESOME DESTRUCTIVE POWER.

- OVERALL, WE ENJOY AN ADVANTAGE -- OVER THREE-TO-ONE -- IN DELIVERABLE WARHEADS.

- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PAYLOAD OF THE US BOMBER FORCE, THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT IS MORE THAN OFFSET.

-- OUR TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD IN STRATEGIC FORCES IS CLEAR:

- OUR STRATEGIC MISSILES ARE MORE ACCURATE, MORE RELIABLE, AND MAINTAINED AT A HIGHER STATE OF READINESS.

- WE ARE ABLE TO PUT MORE WARHEADS ON EACH MISSILE BECAUSE OF OUR UNMATCHED SOPHISTICATION IN ELECTRONICS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY.

- OUR CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY HAS SURGED FAR AHEAD OF THE USSR'S.

- OUR SUBMARINES ARE HARDER TO DETECT -- AND OUR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES ARE FAR MORE ADVANCED.

-- CONTINUED GROWTH OF THE SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM WOULD BE CAUSE FOR CONCERN, BUT THE PROGRAM
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NOW APPEARS TO BE DESIGNED ONLY TO PROVIDE SOME PROTECTION FOR THE SOVIET POLITICAL ELITE AND KEY INDUSTRIAL MANAGERS AND WORKERS, RATHER THAN THE GENERAL POPULATION. WE ARE FOLLOWING THIS PROGRAM CLOSELY.

- THE ECONOMY -- AND PROBABLY THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TOO -- WOULD BE DESTROYED IN THE EVENT OF WAR.

-- IN SUM, WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE RECENT ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC FORCES, WE REMAIN VIGILANT, DETERMINED, AND CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN HAVE NO HOPE OF ACHIEVING SUPERIORITY, NO MATTER HOW INTENSIVE THEIR EFFORT.

-- OUR FORCES WILL REMAIN SUFFICIENT TO DETER
SOVIET ATTACK AND TO DENY THE SOVIETS ANY MILITARY
OR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE FROM THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES.

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

-- THE US HAS MORE THEATER NUCLEAR WARHEADS
THAN THE USSR.
-- THE SOVIETS ARE MODERNIZING THEIR THEATER
NUCLEAR POSTURE WITH SUCH WEAPONS AS THE SS-X-20
MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE. BUT THE US HAS
SEVERAL NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS -- E.G.,
NEW TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, LANCE MISSILES -- TO ENSURE A
STABLE OVERALL NUCLEAR BALANCE WILL BE MAINTAINED.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

-- GENERALLY SPEAKING, SOVIET CONVENTIONAL
FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS AND LARGE-SCALE TANK,
ARTILLERY, AIRCRAFT, AND SHIP PRODUCTION CONFRONT
THE US AND ITS ALLIES WITH A SERIOUS CHALLENGE
IN THE AREA OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. HOWEVER,
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THE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE RESPONDED WITH THEIR OWN
FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS, AND WE WILL CONTINUE
TO MEET THE SOVIET CHALLENGE.

-- BUT THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, WHERE THE
GROWTH IN SOVIET AND WESTERN CONVENTIONAL POWER
HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED, IS CURRENTLY STABLE.
- INCALCULABLY HIGH RISKS WOULD FACE AN
AGGRESSOR.
- THE USSR COULD NOT BE CONFIDENT OF MIL-
ITARY SUCCESS IN THE EVENT OF A EUROPEAN WAR.

-- QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS WHICH SHOW SOME
SOVIET LEADS ARE NOT ALWAYS USEFUL IN LOOKING AT
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. THEY IGNORE DIFFERENCES IN
THE QUALITY OF WEAPONS AND TRAINING, WHICH GENERALLY
FAVOR THE WESTERN ALLIES. MOREOVER, WESTERN GROUND
FORCE DOCTRINE PUTS A GREATER PROPORTION OF WEAPONS
ON LINE THAN THE WARSAW PACT'S. FINALLY, EVEN
QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS DO NOT SHOW NATO IN A BAD
LIGHT.

-- EACH SIDE HAS OVER TWO MILLION MEN IN THEIR
GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS
STATION LARGE FORCES IN ASIA, AND THEY CANNOT BE
CONFIDENT OF THE MILITARY PERFORMANCE OF THEIR
SO-CALLED ALLIES, WHO PROVIDE NEARLY HALF OF THE
WARSAW PACT'S TROOPS.

-- SOVIET NUMERICAL TANK SUPERIORITY REFLECTS
NATO'S ESSENTIALLY DEFENSIVE ROLE, AND IS OFFSET
BY NATO'S QUALITATIVE SUPERIORITY IN ANTI-TANK
WEAPONRY.

-- THE TOTAL NATO AND WARSAW PACT TACTICAL
AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES ARE ABOUT EQUAL.
- BUT NATO ENJOYS SUBSTANTIAL QUALITATIVE
AIR SUPERIORITY.
- THE US HAS A DEFINITE EDGE IN HIGH PER-
FORMANCE, MULTI-PURPOSE AIRCRAFT WITH SUPERIOR
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GROUND ATTACK EFFECTIVENESS, RANGE, PAYLOAD AND
ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY.
-- THE US AND ITS ALLIES ARE NOW ENGAGED IN A
MAJOR FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, THE THRUST OF WHICH
IS AIMED AT EXPLOITING OUR CONSIDERABLE TECHNOLOGICAL
LEAD TO OFFSET THE SOVIET BUILD-UP.
- IN THE FUTURE, QUALITATIVE FACTORS WILL BE-
COME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING MILITARY
BALANCE.
-- THE ADVENT OF NEW WESTERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS --
AS PRECISION-GUIDED MISSILES -- WILL MAKE NUMERICAL
COMPARISONS OF TANKS AND AIRCRAFT INCREASINGLY
UNIMPORTANT.
-- THE OVERALL NAVAL BALANCE WILL REMAIN
FAVORABLE TO THE US BY A WIDE MARGIN.
- THE SOVIET SURFACE NAVY IS NO MATCH FOR
THE US CARRIER FORCE.
- THE SOVIETS HAVE A LEAD IN NUMBERS OF SUB-
MARINES. BUT US SUBMARINES ARE UNDENIABLY BETTER,
AS ARE US ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO SOUGHT TO IMPROVE OTHER
POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES -- WITH AIRBORNE FORCES,
NAVAL INFANTRY, AIR TRANSPORT, AND AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS.
BUT NONE OF THESE PROGRAMS SIGNIFICANTLY CHALLENGES
THE US PREPONDERANCE IN POWER PROJECTION. FOR EXAMPLE:
- WHILE SOVIET AMPHIBIOUS TONNAGE HAS DOUBLED
IN THE LAST DECADE, IT IS STILL ONLY ONE-SEVENTH OF
US AMPHIBIOUS TONNAGE.
- SOVIET NAVAL INFANTRY HAS ALSO DOUBLED,
BUT IS LESS THAN ONE-TENTH THE SIZE OF THE US MARINE
CORPS.
- THE LIFT CAPACITY OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC
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AIRLIFT IS ONLY HALF THE US AIRLIFT CAPACITY AT
COMPARABLE RANGES.

CONCLUSION

-- A SOPHISTICATED ANALYSIS OF US AND SOVIET
MILITARY CAPABILITIES DEFINITELY DOES NOT REVEAL
A SOVIET ADVANTAGE.

-- IN THE TWO AREAS WHERE THE SOVIET BUILD-UP
HAS BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE -- STRATEGIC FORCES AND
CENTRAL FRONT STRENGTH -- FORCE IMPROVEMENTS THAT
THE US HAS ALREADY PUT IN MOTION WILL MAINTAIN
AND IN TIME STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION.

13. ILLUSTRATIVE DATA

DELIVERABLE WARHEADS: US USSR

ICBM	2154	2195
SLBM	5120	785
BOMBERS (EXCLUDING SRAM)	1256	270
TOTAL	8530	3250

GROSS EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE (EMT):

ICBM	1150	2950
SLBM	780	785
TOTAL	1930	3735

THROW-WEIGHT (MILLIONS LBS):

ICBM	2.4	7.0
SLBM	.9	1.2
TOTAL	3.3	8.2

BOMBER PAYLOAD (MILLIONS LBS): US USSR

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GROUND FORCE MANPOWER (COMBAT AND DIRECT SUPPORT - IN THOUSANDS):

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

NATO	WP	(OF WHICH USSR)
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635	910	620
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SOUTHERN EUROPE

540	395	155
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MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN SERVICE:

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

NATO	WP	(OF WHICH USSR)
------	----	-----------------

7000	19000	11000
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SOUTHERN EUROPE

4000 7500 2750

ARTILLERY PIECES IN SERVICE:

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

NATO WP

2700 5600

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SOUTHERN EUROPE

3500 2700

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